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ARGUMENT
POINT I
REEVES HAS MADE NO GOOD FAITH ARGUMENT
REGARDING VOIR DIRE OF GENERAL BACKGROUND
The trial court refused t|o ask the following voir
dire questions:
Question 1:

How long have you lived in
Washington County?

Question 2:

If you have lived here
less than JO years, where
did you come from?

Question 3:

What is your age?

Question 5:

What is the highest level
of [your] education?

Question 6:

What degrees
received?

have

you

Jane Doe's brief relies on the landmark Utah case
of State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utdh 1984) as well as three
recent

federal cases which are sqparely

in point.

(See

Appellant's Brief, at p.2 & 3,)
Reeves'
issue.

brief

virtually

this

important

First, Reeves says that the attorneys could guess at

the jurors ages by looking at them.
p.10.)

ignores

(Brief of Respondent, at

That is perhaps so; but Reeves offers no authority

1

for the proposition that guesswork

is an excuse for voir

dire*
With respect to questions

1, 2, 5 and 6 above,

Reeves' only comment is as follows:
The
requested
voir
dire
questions . . • were properly denied by the
court as not being probative of matters
that would shed light on the bias,
prejudice, or impartiality
of
the
jurors . . .
Brief of Respondent, at p. 9 and 10.

Reeves has offered no

argument, no analysis, and no authority to support the trial
court's ruling.

Indeed, Reeve's suggestion that the voir

dire must be "probative" is directly contradicted by State v.
Ball,

Id. at p. 1058-59.

State v. Ball teaches that one

purpose of voir dire is to permit counsel to intelligently
exercise peremptory challenges.

Suppose, for example, that

counsel does not like Greek jurors.

Counsel may ask whether

members of the jury panel were born in Greece.
that question is not relevant to anything.

Of course,

Nevertheless,

counsel may ask irrelevant questions in order to get rid of
Greek

jurors.

Thus,

questions

that

relate

solely

to

peremptory challenges are by their very nature irrelevant.
Voir dire is not a trivial issue.

Failure to ask

simple questions, such as educational background, deprives a
litigant of an important historical right.
2

(See Art Press

Ltd. v. Western Printing Machinery
1986.)

791 F.2d 616 (7th Cir,

(Copy attached as Exhibit A
POINT II
REEVES HAS MADE NO GOOD FAITH ARGUMENT
REGARDING ISSUES OF ALCQHOL, TOBACCO
AND PRE-MARITAL SEX
During

the

trial,

Reejves

offered

verbal

or

documentary evidence that Jane Doe:
1.

Smokes;

2.

Drinks alcohol;

3.

Had an abortion or miscarriage;

4.

Submitted to a voluntary sterilization;

5.

Engaged in pre-maritaJL sex;

6.

Used marijuana.

Only item No. 6 (marijuani) was excluded.

All of

the other items were received into evidence
Jane Doe's brief argued tljiat all of the foregoing
items were irrelevant and amounted |to intentional character
assassination.

(Brief of Appellant, at pp.12-19.)

Reeves' brief argues that the evidence on smoking,
alcohol

and pre-marital

sex was ail harmless because the

evidence was only in documents (viz

hospital records which

were received into evidence) while nothing was said verbally

(See Brief of Respondent, at p.24,25.)

That argument is

frivolous because it assumes that the jury never looks at
exhibits-

Defense counsel must have believed that the jury

would look at the exhibits or he wouldn't have offered them.
Reeves has offered no authority for this novel argument.
After

Jane

Doe's

opening

brief was

filed, this

court decided the case of Belden v. Dalbo, 80 Utah Adv.Rpto
20 (April 14, 1988).
the

time

of

the

Belden involved an auto accident.

accident,

the

plaintiff

involved in an extra-marital affair.
asked

a series of questions which

marital relationship.

was

focused

on the extra-

Dalbo and Peel's attorney argued that
Lingwall's extra-marital affair with
Belden may have had some relevance to
his state of mind at the time of the
accident.
However, the
evidence
conceivably could have affected the
juries opinion of Lingwall, provoked its
instinct to punish and improperly entered
into the juries deliberations.
In
weighing the probative value of the
evidence versus its prejudicial effect,
we find that the danger of unfair
prejudice is significantly greater than
the relevance of the evidence. . .We
hold, therefore, that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting the
evidence of Lingwall's purported extramarital affair with Belden.

4

allegedly

The defense attorney

This court stated:

80 Utah Adv.Rpt. at p. 23.

At

In Belden, the court found that the error was not
prejudicial.
whether

According to Belden, phe test for prejudice is

".

.

.there

is

a

reasonable

likelihood

that a

different result would have been reached absent the tainted
evidence,"

80 Utah Adv.Rpt. at p. 23.

Jane Doe respectfully

submits that Belden misstates the test.

(See cases collected

at Brief of Appellant, p. 46 and 47.)

Nevertheless, in the

case

at

bar, there was

"a reasonable

likelihood

that a

different result would have been reached absent the tainted
evidence."

(See Brief of Appellant,, at p. 49.)

Thus, Jane

Doe was prejudiced under any test
POINT III
REEVES HAS MADE NO GOOD FAITH
ARGUMENT REGARDING THE MISCARRIAGE
AND VOLUNTARY STERI JZATION
Over

Jane

Doe's

vigorous

objection,

the

court

received evidence on miscarriage and voluntary sterilization
(or spontaneous abortion).
testimony
prejudice

on

grounds

(Rule

403

of

Jane Doe's brief challenged the
relevance | (Rule

U.R.E.).

J&ne

402 U.R.E.) and

Doe's

argument

supported by ten significant citations of authority.
Brief of Appellant at pp.26-30.)
argument was that:

was
(See

The core of Jane Doe's

[MJatters concerning the etiology of a
medical condition may generally only be
proved by expert testimony.
Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mtn., Inc., 584 P.2d 432, 441 (Wash.
App. 1984) .
In response, Reeves cites two cases:

Thompson v.

LeGrande Johnson Construction Co., 688 P.2d 489 (Utah 1984);
and Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982).
those cases are not in point.

However,

The issue in Dixon v. Stewart,

supra, was whether or not an expert may testify.
words, was the expert testimony admissible.

In other

The issue in the

case at bar is whether an expert must testify to establish a
causal

relationship.

Thompson

v.

LeGrande,

actually the opposite of the case at bar.

supra.,

is

Thompson holds

that a jury is not required to believe expert testimony.
However, Thompson

certainly

does

not

hold

that

a causal

relationship can be established without expert testimony.
In this case, Jane Doe suffered from depression.
Jane Doe's theory at trial was that the depression (or brain
injury) was caused by the car accident.

On the other hand,

defendant's theory was that the depression was caused by the
miscarriage/sterilization.

Thus, the precise legal issue is

whether expert testimony is required to establish the cause
(or etiology) of mental depression; or can a jury decide the
cause of depression based on lay testimony.
6

Indeed, defendant's expert has testified that the
cause of depression is a complex medical issue:
Q.

[To the defense expert]
can cause depression^

A.

Oh, there are a host of things.
Complications in a person's life;
threats to their fhuture; various
kinds of changes in s|itability of the
biochemical system, which may not
necessarily mean brcijin damage, but
it may mean biochemical changes.
Death of a loved one; grief of any
sort; grieving the loss of a job;
grieving the loss of a loved one.
Virtually anything that one can
grieve over can brecipitate a
depression organic brain damage can
precipitate a depress)ion. A host of
causes.
•

(April 9 Tr. at p. 265.)

*

What things

*

Reeves

has

offered

no

authority

that a jury can decide such a complex medical issue (etiology
of depression) without expert testimony!

For example, in the

absence of expert testimony, how could the jury know if Jane
Doe's depression was from miscarriage or a change in brain
chemistry?
Reeves' remaining argument) is a characterization of
the record.

Reeves' brief states:
Dr. Weight
f u r t h e r testified
t h a t i f he had been aware of
the
miscarriage
or
the
sterilization, he would have
gone into those mat ters very
deeply to determine whether or
7

not those two factors were the
cause of her depression.
(Brief of Respondent, at p.27.)
The actual testimony was a bit different:
Q.

Had you been aware of the sterilization at the time that you were interviewing and testing her, would—
what would it have done, if anything, to have changed the way
you did all of your tests or
the way that you discussed it
with her?

A.

Well, I would specifically want to
know about it. I would want to know
anything that might contribute to
the depression . . .

Q.

And would sterilization be one of
the potentially real serious causes
of depression?

A.

It could be. It would be something
I would want her opinion on.
I
would want to know, you know,
whether that's something she was
having a hard time living with, a
decision like that.

(April 9 Tr. at p. 265-268.) (Emphasis added.)
In
opportunity

short,
to

the

connect

riage/sterilization.

defense
the

expert

depression

was
with

given
the

every

miscar-

He was not able to form an opinion.

most, he could only say:

"It could be."

Or in other words,

the defense expert was merely speculating.

Without expert

testimony, the jury was also permitted to speculate.

8

At

Finally, Reeves

argued

that

Jane Doe

failed to

reveal the miscarriage/sterilization during the independent
medical

examination.

(Brief

of

Respondent,

at

p.27.)

However, that is not because Jane Doe was trying to hide
anything.

Rather, no one bothered to ask her1:
[To defense experjt by defense
counsel]
Is it one that you would
have expected her to talk about with
you
[the decisioh to have
sterilization], now that you are
aware of it?

Only since she commented when I
asked if there were children, that
they had delayed theilr family and so
I had no idea tha|t that was a
choice, so I would!-I don't know
that it would have spontaneously
come up other than my pursuing, you
know, "What's troubling you?"
(April 9 Tr. at p. 268-69.)
A.

*It seems that the flaw is nt>t because Jane Doe was
trying to hide something; rather, the defendant attorney
failed to prepare his own expert to delve into those areas.
After all, defense counsel had a 11 of Jane Doe's prior
hospital records including the steri ization and miscarriage.
(See Brief of Respondent, at p. 31-32.) Presumably, defense
counsel could have given those records to his own expert in
preparation for the independent medical exam,
Certainly,
Jane Doe has no duty to unilaterally haul all of her old
medical records in to the independent medical exam. That is
especially so where Jane Doe doesn
even regard those prior
records as being relevant.
In summary, it is defense
counsel's fault that his own expert} did not know about the
miscarriage/sterilization.

9

Jane Doe's expert did not regard the issue to be
of any significance.
Q. , [To plaintiff's expert by defense
counsel]--and from Dr. Weight's
report, was it ever divulged to you
by [Jane Doe] or any other sources
that on March 3 of 1980 that she
had a miscarriage?
A.

Nof she did not, and it wouldn't
have been significant to me.
4e

*

"k

ie

Q.

You didn't think that if she had
anxiety about having a family, that
it would be of any problem for her?

A.

Not if she didn't identify it and
not after six years. That's a long
time.

(April 9 Tr., at p. 158-159.)
Finally, there is simply no evidence that questions
on

miscarriage

or

psychological exam.

sterilization

are

part

of

a

standard

Thus, there was nothing sinister about

Jane Doe failing to reveal the miscarriage/sterilization to
the doctors.

Indeed, neither doctor regarded the subject as

significant enough to even ask the question.^

^The defense expert apparently conducted his standard
interview. (April 9 Tr. at p. 221-222.) There is absolutely
no evidence that Jane Doe lied in her interview. Rather, the
doctor didn't ask the question.

10

POINT IV
REEVES HAS MADE NO GOOD FiVlTH ARGUMENT
REGARDING THE SURPRISE TESTIMONY
Jane

Doe

argued

miscarriage/sterilization
trial.

that

was

the

testimony

introduced

(Brief of Appellant, at p.|20.)

regarding

as a surprise at
Jane Doe's opening

brief argued that the miscarriage/stlerilization testimony was
not

revealed

in answers

to

interrogatories.

Jane

Doe' s

opening brief further argued that tne miscarriage/sterilization testimony was not revealed in| the extensive pre-trial
order.

(Brief of Appellant,at p. 22.)

Reeves is silent.

On these issues,

Apparently, Reevels concedes both points!

Reeves sole response to thp issue of surprise issue
was that:
Thus, at least one year |>rior to trial,
plaintiff's counsel was obtaining and
examining all medical rbcords on the
plaintiff. If the information pertaining
to miscarriage
and tihe voluntary
sterilization came as
surprise to
plaintiff's counsel, it s only because
of his failure to examine tnedical records
to which he had acces$ long before
defendant counsel did.
In addition to that, the so-called
surprise" testimony pert aining to the
miscarriage/sterilization was information
within the knowledge and understanding of
the plaintiff herself. I she failed to
inform her counsel of f acts germane to
the issues in this case, . t does not lie
in counsel to try to shift responsibility
11

away from plaintiff and attempt to place
it on defense counsel.
There was no
surprise that could not readily have been
examined, and for which plaintiff's
counsel had access long before defense
counsel.
Brief of Respondent, at p. 32.
Reeves

has

offered

no

authority

for this novel

argument•
Jane Doe concedes that she and her counsel were
both aware of the history of the miscarriage/sterilization.
However, Jane Doe was not aware of the defense theory that
the miscarriage/sterilization caused the depression (rather
than the car accident causing the depression).
An example may be helpful.
had eggs and bacon for breakfast.

Suppose that Jane Doe

Suppose, at trial, Reeves

suddenly offered evidence that Jane Doe had eaten eggs and
bacon.

Jane

relevance.

Doe might

first

object

on

the

grounds of

However, Reeves might respond that eggs and bacon

are relevant on the theory that Jane Doe's brain damage was
caused by an allergic reaction to the eggs and bacon.

Next,

Jane Doe might object on the grounds of surprise because the
eggs and bacon theory had not been revealed
discovery.

in pretrial

Suppose Reeves then argues (as here) that there

can be no surprise because Jane Doe obviously knows what she
had for breakfast.

The argument is absurd.
12

Of course, Jane

Doe knows what she had for breakfast, but she would have no
way of knowing that her breakfast menu would be injected into
the trial.

Nor, could Jane Doe have any way of knowing the

defense theory that bacon and eggs caused the brain damage.
This was not a minor technical error.
egregious error.

This was an

The issue goes f ar beyond mere surprise.

Here there was a detailed, formal pre-trial order.

There was

no good faith basis for a violation of that pre-trial order.

POINT V
REEVES' BRIEF HAS TOTALLY IGNORED
THREE CRUCIAL EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
A crucial point in the trial was the admission of
hospital

records

regarding

Jane

Doe challenged

(See

Brief

of

those

Appellant,

miscarriage

and

sterilization.

documents on multiple grounds.
at

p.

20-34.)

Reeves' brief

responded to some—but not all of the issues.

Specifically,

Reeves failed to even respond to the following issues:
1.

Jane Doe claims that the trial court careless-

ly admitted exhibits into evidence because
jury] don't read them anyway."
p. 33.)

" . . . they [the

(S^e Brief of Appellant at

Jane Doe contends that act | was an abuse of discre-

tion.

13

2.

Jane Doe claims that receiving the voluminous

hospital records violated Rule 403 U.R.E. (confusion).

(See

Brief of Appellant, at p.30.)
3.

Jane

Doe claims

that

some portions

hospital records violated Rule 805 U.R.E.
hearsay).

of the

(hearsay within

(See Brief of Appellant, at p.31-32.)
It is clear from the record that the trial judge

refused to even consider these objections.

(See Brief of

Appellant, at pp.28-34.)
These are crucial issues based squarely on the Utah
Rules of Evidence and respectable authority.

The issues

deserve more than mere silence!
POINT VI
REEVES HAS MADE NO GOOD FAITH ARGUMENT
ON THE LAY TESTIMONY ISSUE
Jane
erroneously
Parker.

Doe's

excluded

brief
the

argued

lay

that

opinion

the

evidence

(Brief of Appellant, at pp.35-40.)

responded that no proper foundation was laid.
Reeves says:

14

trial
of

court
Dennis

Reeves' brief
Specifically,

No issue was ever raisled that (sic)
opinion was to be given by a lay witness,
as permitted by Rule 701J
It never got
to that point, because the witness did
give conclusionary opinions without the
necessary laying of the foundation.
(Brief of Respondent, at p. 44.)(Emphasis added.)
Reeves has simply misread the record.

It is true

that there were some preliminary skirmishes on foundational
questions.
crossed.

However,

the

foundatlional

hurdles

had

been

The ultimate question was bs follows:
Q.

Based on what you have observed,
please answer the question based on
what you observed.

A.

What I observed is that they have—
they were very clo pe with their
family and they are now, I mean,
they stay at home.

MR. JEFFS:

Objection, he's giving a conclusion

THE COURT:

The objection is sust ined.

(April 9 Tr. at p. 33.) (Emphasis addled. )
Thus, the specific object jLon before the court was
that the witness was giving a cone usion (or lay opinion) .
That specific issue was briefed by Jane Doe and ignored by
Reeves.

15

POINT VII
THEY JURY CAN BE MISLED BY PLAY-ACTING
Jane

Doe

argued

that

the

jury

was

misled

by

permitting a frail widow (and non-party) to sit at counsel
table.

(Brief of Appellant, at pp.7-12.)
Reeves responded thatt
Nowhere in the oral argument nor in any
presentation was there any reference
whatsoever to Florence Reeves except for
the utilization of her help in the
selection of jurors during voir
dire . . .

(Brief of Respondent, at p. 22.)
Reeves' argument seems to be that play-acting is
okay as long as no words are used on the record.

However,

everyone knows that a lawyer can send messages to the jury
without using words.
854 (Wis. 1979).

See e.g. Brons v. Bischoff, 277 N.W.2d

(Plaintiff claimed she could not sit at

counsel table because of pain; however, the court refused
permission to let plaintiff stand in the courtroom because
the jury would be misled.)
Reeves claims that the widow was only permitted to
sit at counsel table for the sole purpose of assisting with

16

voir dire.J
purpose!

However, the jury was not told of that limited

All the jury knew is that the frail widow was at

counsel table for part of the trial, and then that she got
sick and went home.
Reeves

has

cited

absolutely

no

authority

would permit a non-party to sit at counsel table.
additional

case which

precluded

a widow

from

which
For an

sitting

at

counsel table, see Livingston v. Bias, 640 P.2d 362 (Kan.
1982) .
POINT VIII
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO VOIR DIRE
CONCERNING JUROR ATTITUDES TOWARD PERSONAL
INJURY CASES ALLOWED JURORS TO SIT WITHOUT
DETERMINING BIAS OR PARTIALITY
1•

There Was No Voir Dire to Bring Out Any Connection
Jurors May Have Had With Insurance Companies.
Jane Doe tried to ask the jury panel whetherf
.any

company?"

of

you

own

stock

in

any

liability

insurance

It is "the almost universal view that . . .

a

plaintiff may, in good faith, interrogate the jury on voir

J

Jane Doe does not concede that the widow "assisted"
voir dire in any way. Rather she sat silently as a "prop."
17

dire as to their, or their relatives', possible connection
with, or interesjt in, liability insurance companies .
95

A.L.R.

404, I Annot.

"Informing

Jury

of

Liability

In-

surance. "
The question proposed by Jane Doe complied with
Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P.2d 224 (1932).

Reeves

tries to distinguish Balle because that case involved a local
company.

But the possibility of a juror's financial stake in

a case is not limited to local companies as Reeves suggests.
A juror with stopk in a major national firm (e.g. Allstate)
has the same financial risk as a juror with stock in a local
insurance company.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "counsel for
plaintiff is entitled to learn of any juror's interest in or
connection with any insurance or casualty company
Kilpack v. Wiqnall, 604 P.2d 462, 463 fn.2 (1979).
added.)

(Emphasis

If Kilpack is inconsistent with Tjas v. Proctor, 591

P.2d 438 (Utah 1979), this court must follow the more recent
opinion, Kilpack

Other cases cited by Reeves, Young v.

Barney, 20 Ut.2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967); Ellis v. Gilbert,
19 Ut.2d 261, 429 P.2d 39 (1967) and Robinson v. Hreinson, 17
Ut.2d

261, 409

P. 2d

insurance as evidence.

121

(1961) all

deal with

admitting

On the other hand, the case at Bar

deals with the 4ntr°duction of insurance during voir dire,
18

Furthermore, those cases are superseded by Rule 411, Utah
Rules of Evidence.
The recent case of King v. Fereday, 739 P. 2d 618
(Utah 1987) held that the court might ask if jurors owned
stock in a business instead of asking if jurors owned stock
in an insurance company.

However, in this case, the lower

court failed to ask either question.
2.

There Was No Voir Dire Sufficient
Related to Tort Reform Publicity.

to

Uncover

Bias

Jane Doe submitted evidence of a recent advertising
campaign

(by

insurance

companies)

public about jury awards.
to

use

voir

dire

to

advertising campaign.

designed

to

scare

the

Jane Doe should have been allowed

determine

juror

attitudes

to

this

State v. Nichols, 734 P. 2d 170 (Mont.

1987) at 173:
Voir dire must be used to determine which
jurors have been so affected by pretrial
publicity, [that] they would be unable to
render a fair verdict.
U.S. v. Whitt, 718 F.2d 1494 (10th Cir. 1983) at 1497:
Where there is the possibility or
likelihood that potential jurors have
been exposed to prejudicial publicity,
they must be questioned with special care
so as to insure that such publicity did
not result in bias.
State v. Greenawalt, 624 P.2d 828 (Ariz. 1981) at 841:
An examination of the jurors, through
voir dire process, is an effective means
19

by which to determine the effects or
influence of pretrial publicity on the
jurors.
Without
insurance

an

industry's

effective
media

voir

blitz,

dire

there

regarding
was

no

the

way

to

determine whethep jurors should have been excused for cause;
nor was counsel able to intelligently exercise peremptory
challenges on that issue-

Borkoski v. Yost, 594 P. 2d 688

(Mont 1979); Kind v. Westlake 572 S.W.2d 841 (Ark. 1978).
Reeves | asserts that "questions 23, 24, 39 and 40
were calculated to circumvent the prohibitions of Rule 411 of
the Rules of Evidence.^

(Brief of Respondent, at p.10.)

Howeverf the opposite is true.
alia, to

show

Rule 411 allows evidence of

insurance,

inter

"bias or prejudice

of a

witness."

If insurance is admissible to test the bias of a

witness, it should be admissible to test the bias of a juror.
Furthermore, the voir dire questions only probed
juror bias toward insurance generally, and made no implication that Reeves was in fact insured.

Rule 411. liiability Insurance: "Evidence that a person
was or was not insured against liability is not admissible
upon the issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise
wrongfully.
Thjs rule does not require the exclusion of
evidence of insurance against liability when offered for
another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or
control, or bigs or prejudice of a witness." (Emphasis
added.)
20

Reeves further claims that "Jane Doe" failed to lay
a proper Borkoski foundation because no juror had said there
was

anything

ability

to

in their background that would affect their
be

impartial.

Reeves misleads

the court by

leaving out the alternative Borkoski foundation:

a showing

that a juror has read magazines or periodicals which have
contained insurance propaganda.
at 695.
ask

In order to lay this foundation, Jane Doe tried to

which

However,

Borkoski v. Yost, supra,

magazines

Reeves

jurors

objected.

subscribed
The

to

objection

(Question 6).
was

sustained.

Having prevented Jane Doe from laying the foundation, Reeves
cannot now complain about the lack of foundation.
POINT IX
JANE DOE WAS IMPROPERLY REQUIRED TO PROVE
FUTURE DAMAGE TO A REASONABLE CERTAINTY
1.

The Adequacy of Plaintiff's Objection to the Instructions 21 and 23.
Instructions 21 and 23 limited Jane Doe's recovery

to

future damages

that were reasonably certain to occur.

Plaintiff objected as follows,
Instruction 21 refers to
certainty, "reasonably certain
in the future."
And in fact
read "reasonably probable to
the future."
21

reasonable
to suffer
it should
suffer in

As to Instruction 2 3 , again it speaks in
terms of "reasonable medical certainty"
instead of "reasonable medical probability(April 10 Tr., p.

112-113.)

Objections must "state distinctly the matter to which
[plaintiff] objbets, and the ground

for

Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
stated

distinctly

"certain."

the matter

objected

[her] objection."

Jane Doe's objection
to, i.e.

the word

The ground was also stated, i.e. that the proper

word is "probab e."

t

A lengthy argument was not necessary.^

Reeves complain^ that "No citation was given to Court[sic]
upon which it could predicate any evaluation of the claimed
^A lengthy argument had, in fact, occurred in chambers
The court has been reviewing with counsel
the instructions to be given to the jury
as well as the special verdict form. The
court has advised them that they may now
make their exceptions and objections to
the Court's instructions.
* * * *

MR. DE^RY: Your Honor, may I add for the
record] if the Court please, that in
addition to that, the Court has, for well
over an hour, consulted with counsel in
some detail on each jury instruction, so
that the record--the Court has heard
comments from counsel on the-THE COURT:

Yes, I have.

MR. DEBRY:

— o n the instructions.
22

objection."

(Brief of Respondent, p.49.)

But the fact that

counsel

not

authority

did

have

controlling

Utah

at

his

fingertips does not affect the adequacy of the objection:
We know of no ruling that requires a
lawyer to cite specific cases on
objection to evidence admitted at trial
so long as the grounds relied upon are a
correct interpretation of the law.
Indeed,
in many
instances,
the
objections
arise
in
unforeseen
situations, and to adopt the requirement
that appellees suggest would be to put
upon a trial lawyer an unduly burdensome
duty.
First Nat. Bank v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 237 N.E.2d
108,

111

(Ind.

1968).

Few trials

are

recessed,

so that

counsel can search for controlling precedents to support an
objection.
The objection "was sufficient to bring to the trial
court's attention the principle relied on . . .

"

Fromen v.

Perrin, 213 N.W.2d 684, 690 (Iowa 1973) (objection to four
specific

words

in

instruction

with

statement

language sufficient to preserve error).

of

correct

Compare Jane Doe's

objection with Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541, 547
(Utah 1984) (objection that instruction was "not a correct
statement of the law" and which referred to wrong paragraph
was

insufficient).

specific and accurate.

Jane

Doe's

objection

was

distinct,

Taken in conjunction with a lengthy

23

(well over one ijour) conference off the record, the judge was
adequately advid ed of Jane Doe's position.

2.

Jane Doe was Held to an Improperly Strict Burden of
Proof.
A

plaintiff

such

as

Jane

Doe may

damages probably caused by the accident.

recover

for

Moore v. D.R.G.W.

Ry. Co. , 4 Ut.2ti 255; 292 P.2d 849 (1956); Kirchgastner v,
D. R . G. W. Ry. Co, 218 P.2d 685 (Utah 1950); Picino v. UtahApex Mining Co., 52 Utah 338; 173 P. 900 (1918).

This rule

was recently rea tfirmed by the Utah Supreme Court:
The evidence must do more than merely
give rise to speculation that damages in
fact occurred; it must give rise to a
reasonable probability that the plaintiff
suffered damage ] ". .
Atkin, Wright & Miller v. Mtn. States Telegraph and Telephone
Co. , 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985).

This is in accord with

the general rulq that a plaintiff must prove her case by a
preponderance of the evidence.
The dif ference between probability and certainty is
not idle semantic s (as defendant suggests).
given meaning

Instructions are

in accordance with the ordinary and usual

import of the language as it would be understood by lay
jurors."

Biswelll v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80f88 (Utah 1987).
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"Certain" means
Diet.,

3d

Ed., p.204.

evidence

for

inclines

the mind

doubt."

"free from doubt."

than

"Probable" means:

against,

supported

to believe, but

Ici. at p. 1081.

by

Black's Law
"having more

evidence

leaves

some

which

room

for

(Emphasis added.)

In Whatcott v. Continental Cas. Co., 85 Utah 406;
39 P. 2d 733, 735 (Utah 1935) the Utah Supreme Court found
reversible error in an instruction that said "if you are in
doubt . . . your verdict should be for the defendant."

The

reason was that:
Plaintiff was entitled to a verdict at
the hands of the jury if, to their minds,
she established the material allegations
of her complaint by a preponderance or
greater
weight
of the
evidence.
Obviously
there may
be a clear
preponderance of the evidence in favor of
the existence of an alleged fact and yet
the jury may entertain some doubt about
it being the fact.
Accord,

Miller v. Watkins, 355 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. 1962):
To require proof to a reasonable degree
of certainty is to require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, which is a higher
burden of proof than that required in
civil actions.
In summary, the difference between

and

"certainty"

is

the

difference

"probability"

between

proof

by

preponderance of the evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.
25

The only applicable case cited by defendant is over
twenty-five years old,

Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Ut.2d 261,

409 P.2d 121 (Utah 1961) . 6

Robinson uncritically followed a

standard jury instruction that itself failed to follow prior
Utah precedent. | This court should not make that same error,
but should folllow the rule affirmed in the recent case of
Atkin, Wright & Miller, supra, and followed by the weight of
Utah authority,
3.

Instructing! the Jury to Apply the Wrong Burden of Proof
Was Prejudicial Error
The burden of proof is a crucial issue.

Cases are

won and

lost by the jury's application of the burden of

proof.

Error in instructing the jury on the appropriate

burden of proof is reversible error.
Cas. Co. , supra J 39 P«2d at 735.

Whatcott v. Continental

Accord, Miller v. Watkins,

supra, 355 S.W.id at 3; Parker v. Williams, 268 So.2d 746,
750 (Ala. 1972); Colbert v. Borland, 306 P.2d 53, 58 (Cal
App. 1967); Boltk v. Brunner, 138 A.2d 713, 716 (N.J. 1958)
Furtheifmore, Jane Doe's evidence was consistently
phrased in terms |of "probability," not "certainty."
Tr. at pp. 62, 66 and 93.)

(April 9

The jury may well have concluded

that Jane Doe failed to meet her burden of proof because the
^Alverado v Tuckett, 2 Ut.2d 16, 268 P.2d 986 (1954)
merely affirms tfhe preponderance of the evidence standard
urged by Jane Doe).
26

testimony did not rise to a level of certainty, as opposed to
probability.
POINT X
THE ISSUE OF
DR. CAPEL'S TESTIMONY IS MOOT
Jane

Doe

(Dr.Capel) whether

asked
her

her

treating

injuries

sustained.

doctor

would make her barbering

"more difficult or impossible-"
question was

orthopedic

Reeves objected that the

"leading and suggestive."

The objection was

Jane Doe argued that the trial court erred by

sustaining the objection.

Brief of Appellant, at p. 44.

Reeves' response was that the answer received was in evidence
before

the

court

sustained

Respondent, at p. 51.
Jane

Doe

will

the

objection.

Brief

of

Although that is a curious position,

accept

the

concession.

This

issue

is,

therefore, moot.

POINT XI
THE COST OF POSSIBLE FUTURE SURGERY WAS RELEVANT
TO ASSESSING THE FUTURE MEDICAL RISKS TO JANE DOE
Jane

Doe's

treating

orthopedic

doctor

testified

that she faces a risk of traumatic arthritis in her shoulder
as a result of the accident.
27

(April 8 Tr. p. 93.)

Reeves

apparently concedes that the risk of future arthritis was
properly brought before the jury.
388; 472 P.2d 9142 (1970). ^

Brown v. Johnson, 24 Ut.2d

Reeves' objection goes only to

Dr. Capel's estimate of future costs of possible surgery.
Jane Doe does not argue that the cost of surgery
would be recoverable, in full, as an item of special damages.
Reeves concedes that to recover the

full cost of

future

surgery, Jane Doe must show that future surgery was "more
probable than not."

(Brief of Respondent, p.48).

(See

generally, Appellant's Brief at Point IX, p.43-44—proof that
future damages are probablec)
However, the amount of expense associated with the
50 percent (or less) chance of surgery is relevant to assist
the jury in awarding general damages for the risk of future
disability.
Reeves makes a blurry

factual argument that Dr.

Capel said the future surgery was only "possible."

Reeves

picks these words out of context to apparently suggest that
the risk of future surgery was too remote or speculative.
However, Dr. Capel's exact testimony was that:

7

Reeves doe? not cite or discuss this controlling Utah
precedent.
28

It [future surgery] is only possible, and
I wouldn't say that it was any more
possible than 50 percent.
The

fact

that

Dr.

Capel

uses

guarded

medical

terminology does not mean that the jury is unable to evaluate
the evidence.

The jury was entitled to evaluate that risk

whether it was 1 percent or 99 percent.
testimony, the

jury was

unable

Without medical

to properly

evaluate

and

award general damages for that risk.
Reeves argues that the future harm (surgery) "must
be more probable than not . . . ".
p. 48.)

(Brief of Respondent,

However, Reeves' legal argument was rejected by Brown

v. Johnson, supra:
This does not mean that the chances of
sustaining the harm must be over 50
percent. It means that the jury must be
convinced by a preponderance of the
evidence that there is a definite risk of
harm, and when so convinced, the jury
will evaluate that risk.
24 Ut.2d at
392.
POINT XII
THE CAUSE SHOULD BE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
TO ALLOW PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON SPECIAL DAMAGES
Jane Doe sought prejudgment interest on her special
damages.
trial

(Brief of Appellant, at p. 50.)

court

interest."

did

not

fail

to

provide

(Brief of Respondent, at 57.)
29

Reeves states "the
for

prejudgment

While the judgment

seems

ambiguous,

Jane

Doe

accepts

Reeves'

concession.

Therefore, this [court's opinion should confirm that Jane Doe
is entitled to prejudgment interest on her special damages,
pursuant to the Concession of Reeves,

POINT XIII
JANE DOE SHOULD BE ENTITLED
TO COSlTS AND ATTORNEY FEES FOR THE APPEAL
Some of
contested.

the

issues

in this

case

are genuinely-

It is reasonable to have a vigorous debate over

such bona fide issues.
However, other issues are not seriously contested.
The following issues merit sanctions:
1.
to

Jane

Reeves has made no response of any substance

Doe's

background.

claims

regarding

voir

dire

of

(Suj^ra, at Point I.)

2.

Reeves' excuse

for

introducing

evidence on

smoking, drinking, and premarital sex is frivolous.
at Point II.)
character

general

(Supra,

To the extent that this was an intentional

assassination,

counsel

should

personally

be

sanctioned.
3.

Reeves has offered no good faith argument for

introducing surprise medical records in violation of the
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formal pretrial order and contrary to the pretrial discovery.
(Supra, at Point IV.)
4.

Reeves

evidentiary issues.
5.

has

totally

three

important

(Supra., at Point V.)

Reeves has ignored, or misstated, the record

with respect to lay testimony.
6.

ignored

(Supra., at Point VI.)

Placing a non-party, sick, old widow and her

oxygen tank at counsel table was

(at a minimum) "fishy."

(Supra., at Point VII.)
The real

issues

(Points

above) should be hard fought.

appropriate.

(Rule

IX, and XI

However, enormous time has

been wasted on the frivolous issues.
are

III, VIII,

Costs and attorney fees

33, Rules of the Utah Court of

Appeals.)
Respectfully

-TY\L

submitted

this

/o

day

1988.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff

/ \-C~iS

By:

ROBERT J. DEBRY
r

1
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EXHIBIT "A"
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t5,61 In any event, even assuming arguendo that the Walker rule is correct, we
find that the district court erred in deciding
Ferguson's motion to dismiss for want of
personal jurisdiction before determining
whether there was complete diversity. We
note first that the district court stated in
its order that the subject-matter jurisdiction question was as easy to resolve as the
in personam jurisdiction question. Thus,
according to the trial court's own assessment, neither motion was more "convenient" in terms of difficulty. Second, federalism concerns tip the scales in favor of
initially ruling on the motion to remand.
In passing on Ferguson's motion, the district court was required to delve into difficult questions of Illinois law concerning the
fraudulent-enticement doctrine and the
scope of that state's long-arm statute.8 It
should not have considered these issues
when it was presented with a federal question of at least equal, if not less, difficulty
relating to complete diversity among the
parties.
Because the action has been sent back to
state court, we can only reverse the district
court's decision on Ferguson's motion to
dismiss. As indicated above, the remand
must remain undisturbed. We express no
opinion on the merits of the motions filed
below for either remand or dismissal. Because the dismissal is now a nullity, Ferguson remains a defendant in the action remanded to the Illinois state court. See
Waco, 293 U.S. at 143-44, 55 S.Ct. at 7.
Ill
For the reasons stated above, we DENY
Ferguson's motion to dismiss this appeal
and REVERSE that portion of the judgment
of the district court dismissing defendant
Ferguson for lack of personal jurisdiction.

V

ART PRESS, LTD., a Canadian
corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee,
WESTERN PRINTING MACHINERY
COMPANY, an Illinois corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 85-2192,
Uniited States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.
gued Jan. 23, 1986.
;
Decided May 30, 1986.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc
Denied June 27, 1986.
Purchaser brought warranty action for
damages resulting from purchase of paper
cutting machine built by manufacturer.
The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Richard A.
Posner, Circuit Judge, sitting by designation, entered judgment on a jury verdict in
favor of purchaser, and manufacturer appealed. The Court of Appeals, Bauer, Circuit Judge, held that trial judge, who permitted only rudimentary inquiries establishing identity of venirepersons and asking
whether each potential juror believed he
could be impartial, and did not inquire as to
level of veniirepersons' education or permit
inquiry as to their attitudes toward general
nature or particular facts of the case, unduly restricted voir dire.
Vacated and remanded.
1. Jury <s=>131(2)
Trial judge has broad discretion in limiting voir dire of potential jurors, but that
discretion is subject to parties' right to an
impartial jury.

zens of the state in which the suit was brought. 8. In determining the validity of service prior to
removal, a federal court must apply the law of
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (b); Kanzelberger v. Kanthe state unde^ which the service was made, and
zelberger, 782 F.2d 774, 776-77 (7th Cir.1986).
the question if amenability to suit in diversity
When this action was removed, Stride, a citizen
actions continues to be governed by state law
of Illinios, was listed as a defendant. This would
even after rerhoval. See 4 C. Wright & A. Milbe another reason for the district court to considler, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1082 at
er first the realignment of the parties.
329-31 (1969)

ART PRESS v. WESTERN PRINTING MACHINERY CO.
Cite as 791 V2d 616 (7th Cir. 1986)

2. Jury <3=>131(4)
To protect right of parties to an impartial jury, trial court should permit reasonably extensive examination of prospective
jurors so that parties have basis for intelligent exercise of right to challenge, whether for cause or peremptorily.
3. Jury <s=>131(2)
Trial judge's desire not to make voir
dire a "big deal" in a case which is estimated to last only a few days is clearly subsidiary to trial judge's duty to impanel an
impartial jury.
4. Jury <3=»131(4)

Trial judge, who permitted only rudimentary inquiries establishing identity of
venirepersons and asking whether each potential juror believed he could be impartial,
and did not inquire as to level of venirepersons' education or permit inquiry as to
their attitudes toward general nature or
particular facts of the case, unduly restricted voir dire.
5. Jury <s=>131(3)
Purpose of voir dire is to elicit information which shows biases of venireperson or
provides counsel with basis for exercising
peremptory challenges.

Robert E. Kehoe, Jr., Wildman, Harrold,
Allen & Dixon, Chicago, 111., for defendantappellant.
Richard J. Gray, Jenner & Block, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before BAUER, COFFEY and RIPPLE,
Circuit Judges.
BAUER, Circuit Judge.
A jury awarded plaintiff, Art Press, Ltd.,
$94,709.10 in a warranty action for damages resulting from plaintiffs purchase of
a paper cutting machine built by the defendant, Western Printing Machinery Company. We vacate the jury's verdict and the
award and remand for a new trial because
the district court unduly restricted the voir
dire of the venirepersons.

617

We will discuss the facts underlying this
action only insofar as ^hey are important to
the trial court's voir dire of the potential
jurors. At the final pre-trial conference,
plaintiffs attorney requested that the trial
judge ask each venireperson his occupation
and level of formal education, and whether
he had any family or friends in the printing
or printing equipment business. Defendant's attorney joined in this request and
further asked the cburt to question the
potential jurors as to their mechanical aptitude, their hobbies and interests, and other
background information.
The trial court suggested that the parties
stipulate to a minimum educational level
requirement for the jurors, but plaintiffs
counsel declined. The trial court then
asked counsel why ne was interested in
voir dire concerning the level of formal
education, to which plaintiffs counsel responded:
I
[I]t helps me when I'm addressing the
juror if I have some idea of who that
juror is. It's just a question—and perhaps [defendant's counsel] will share my
view here—of my understanding of what
I need to do as a lawyer to relate to that
particular juror, and if I have some idea
of the educational background or the occupation of that juror, it allows me, I
think, to do a better job of lawyering.
Defendant's counsel then added:
I guess there are a number of things to
look for in trying to decide what is a
good juror for this case or any case,
although you want to tailor it to the
ability to hear and understand the kinds
of issues that are presented in this particular case. Certainly, we want to try
to ferret out any bias that a witness may
have, but on top of that, I think we also
want to try to familiarize ourselves with
the chemical background of the jurors,
because each of these jurors is asked to
bring to bear theiih background, experience and common judgments, common
experiences, in deciding these issues, and
in connection with trying to make a decision whether or not to exercise a peremp-
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tory challenge, I know myself, and I suspect [plaintiffs counsel], too, would like
to know as much as we possibly can
about each of these potential jurors. I
agree with [plaintiffs counsel] that I
don't think we can set any qualifications
for eligibility here.
The trial judge stated that he had "grave
doubts" about asking questions concerning
education because he had once observed a
case in which
one of the lawyers used his peremptory
challenges to get rid of the only jurors
who seemed by their background to be
equipped to understand the case. That's
why if you want to stipulate that you
were looking for some minimum education, that would be fine, but I don't
want you using—one of you using your
peremptory challenges to get rid of a
person who has some business background or some education and end up
with a jury of people who don't know
what's going on.
The trial judge took the parties' requests
under advisement, but stated that he did
not "want to make the voir dire a big deal
in a case that's only going to last a couple
of days."
When the jury venire was assembled, the
trial judge first determined whether any of
the venirepersons were not qualified under
28 U.S.C. 1865, which sets forth citizenship,
minimum age, and other basic requirements for jury service. The trial judge
then asked the prospective jurors only the
following questions:
(1) the venireperson's name, address,
and prior jury service;
(2) the venireperson's employer or occupation;
(3) the venireperson's familiarity with either party or their counsel;
(4) if the venireperson (or immediate
family or friends) had been employed in the
printing or machinery business;
(5) if the venireperson felt he could be
impartial in the case.
The trial judge specifically rejected any
voir dire as to the prospective jurors' edu-

cation, stating that he did not want to
"drag out in public the deficiencies of their
education" and that if one of the attorneys
exercised * a peremptory challenge against
someone who had a deficient education, it
might be a little embarrassing." The trial
judge further stated that the attorneys
could "infer from their occupation and their
accent what kind of education [the venirepersons] have."
On appeal, the defendant argues that the
trial judge so limited the voir dire of the
potential jurors that it was prevented from
intelligently exercising its peremptory challenges and pom eliciting information which
could have led to challenges for cause.
Plaintiff argues that the voir dire, though
restricted, was sufficient to obtain an impartial jury.
II.
[1,2] A trial judge has broad discretion
in limiting the voir dire of potential jurors,
but this discretion is subject to the parties'
right to an impartial jury. Fietzer v. Ford
Motor Co., 622 F.2d 281, 284 (7th Cir.1980).
To protect this right, a trial court "should
permit a reasonably extensive examination
of prospective jurors so that the parties
have a basis for an intelligent exercise of
the right to challenge," Fietzer, 622 F.2d at
284, whether for cause or peremptorily.
Id. at 285. \See United States v. Bellinger,
472 F.2d 340, 368 (7th Cir.1972) (trial court
must permit "sufficient inquiry into the
background and attitudes of the jurors to
enable [the parties] to exercise intelligently
their peremptory challenges"). This court
"has been zealous in its protection of probing voir dJre," Fietzer, 622 F.2d at 284
(quoting Btard v. Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485,
501 (7th Cij.1979)), and will reverse a trial
court for abuse of its discretion "when
limitations placed on the parameters of voir
dire threaten to undermine the purpose for
conducting an examination of prospective
jurors." Fietzer, 622 F.2d at 285.
[5-5] We believe that the voir dire conducted in this case was so limited as to
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preclude the parties from adequately discovering whether the jurors were biased or
prejudiced and did not permit sufficient
inquiry to allow the parties to intelligently
exercise their peremptory challenges. We
first note that it is not necessary, as plaintiff seems to assert, to show that a member
of the jury was in fact prejudiced; it is
enough to show that the voir dire did not
reasonably assure that bias or prejudice
would be discovered, if present. Bellinger,
472 F.2d at 367. We do not believe that
the voir dire in this case provided that
reasonable assurance because it failed to
go beyond asking the venirepersons only a
few of what this court in Fietzer termed
"stock questions:" the rudimentary inquiries that establish the identity of the
venireperson. The trial judge did not even
inquire as to the level of the potential jurors' education, which Fietzer also stated
was a "stock question/' l The only inquiry
permitted beyond the basic questions about
the venirepersons' identity was whether
each potential juror believed he could be
impartial. In United States v. Lewin, 467
F.2d 1132, 1138 (7th Cir.1972), this court
held that such "a general question is inadequate to call to the attention of the veniremen those important matters that might
lead them to recognize or display their disqualifying attributes." The trial judge permitted no inquiry designed to elicit the
venirepersons' attitudes toward the general
nature or particular facts of the case. See
Fietzer, 622 F.2d at 286. This severe limitation undermined voir dire's purpose of
eliciting information that shows the biases
of a venireperson or provides counsel with
a basis for exercising peremptory challenges. See Fietzer, 622 F.2d at 284 (quoting Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775,
779 (3rd Cir.1965)); Lemn, 467 F.2d at
1138. We therefore vacate the jury's verdict and award and remand for a new trial.
VACATED AND REMANDED

1. Although this court is sympathetic with trial
judges who wish to avoid lengthy voir dire, a
trial judge's desire not "to make the voir dire a
big deal in a case that's only going to last a
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Administrative law judge determined
that employer had committed unfair labor
practice by discriminatbrily discharging
employees for activities during strike and
recommended that employees be reinstated
and awarded back pay. Almost three
years after National Labor Relations
Board's first hearing in matter, Board affirmed and ordered reinstatement and back
pay for all aggrieved employees. Petition
for enforcement was brought The Court
of Appeals, Flaum, Circuit Judge, held that
Court of Appeals would not refrain from
enforcing Board's order mandating reinstatement, despite employer's claim of newly discovered evidence.
Order enforced.

1. Labor Relations <£=>688
Appellate court has authority to order
National Labor Relations Board to review
new facts that impact on whether remedy
ordered by Board should be enforced. National Labor Relations Act, § 10(e), as
amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(e).
2. Labor Relations <3=>688
Appellate court cannot declare "material" factual matters which under National
couple of days" is clearly subsidiary to his duty
to impanel an impartial jury. Dellinger, Ml
, F.2d at 370 n. 42.

